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Abstract
Adversarial training is an effective methodology for training deep neural networks
that are robust against adversarial, norm-bounded perturbations. However, the
computational cost of adversarial training grows prohibitively as the size of the
model and number of input dimensions increase. Further, training against less
expensive and therefore weaker adversaries produces models that are robust against
weak attacks but break down under attacks that are stronger. This is often attributed
to the phenomenon of gradient obfuscation; such models have a highly non-linear
loss surface in the vicinity of training examples, making it hard for gradient-based
attacks to succeed even though adversarial examples still exist. In this work, we
introduce a novel regularizer that encourages the loss to behave linearly in the vicin-
ity of the training data, thereby penalizing gradient obfuscation while encouraging
robustness. We show via extensive experiments on CIFAR-10 and ImageNet, that
models trained with our regularizer avoid gradient obfuscation and can be trained
significantly faster than adversarial training. Using this regularizer, we exceed
current state of the art and achieve 47% adversarial accuracy for ImageNet with `∞
adversarial perturbations of radius 4/255 under an untargeted, strong, white-box
attack. Additionally, we match state of the art results for CIFAR-10 at 8/255.
1 Introduction
In a seminal paper, Szegedy et al. [23] demonstrated that neural networks are vulnerable to visually
imperceptible but carefully chosen adversarial perturbations which cause neural networks to output
incorrect predictions. After this revealing study, a flurry of research has been conducted with the
focus of making networks robust against such adversarial perturbations [14, 16, 19, 26]. Concur-
rently, researchers devised stronger attacks that expose previously unknown vulnerabilities of neural
networks [25, 4, 1, 3].
Of the many approaches proposed [20, 2, 6, 22, 15, 19], adversarial training [14, 16] is empirically
the best performing algorithm to train networks robust to adversarial perturbations. However, the cost
of adversarial training becomes prohibitive with growing model complexity and input dimensionality.
This is primarily due to the cost of computing adversarial perturbations, which is incurred at each step
of adversarial training. In particular, for each new mini-batch one must perform multiple iterations of
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a gradient-based optimizer on the network’s inputs to find said perturbations.1 As each step of this
optimizer requires a new backwards pass, the total cost of adversarial training scales as roughly the
number of such steps. Unfortunately, effective adversarial training of ImageNet often requires large
number of steps to avoid problems of gradient obfuscation [1, 25], making it much more expensive
than conventional training, almost prohibitively so.
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Figure 1: Example of gradient obfuscated
surface.
One approach which can alleviate the cost of adversarial
training is training against weaker adversaries that are
cheaper to compute. For example, by taking fewer gradient
steps to compute adversarial examples during training.
However, this can produce models which are robust against
weak attacks, but break down under strong attacks – often
due to gradient obfuscation. In particular, one form of
gradient obfuscation occurs when the network learns to
fool a gradient based attack by making the loss surface
highly convoluted and non-linear (see Fig 1), which in
turn prevents gradient based optimization methods from
finding an adversarial perturbation within a small number
of iterations [4, 25]. In contrast, if the loss surface was
linear in the vicinity of the training examples, which is to
say well-predicted by local gradient information, gradient
obfuscation cannot occur. In this paper, we take up this idea and introduce a novel regularizer that
encourages the loss to behave linearly in the vicinity of the training data. We call this regularizer the
local linearity regularizer (LLR). Empirically, we find that networks trained with LLR exhibit far
less gradient obfuscation, and are almost equally robust against strong attacks as they ares against
weak attacks.
The main contributions of our paper are summarized below:
• We show that training with LLR is significantly faster than adversarial training, allowing us
to train a robust ImageNet model with a 5× speed up when training on 128 TPUv3 cores [9].
• We show that LLR trained models exhibit higher robustness relative to adversarially trained
models when evaluated under strong attacks. Adversarially trained models can exhibit a
decrease in accuracy of 6% when increasing the attack strength at test time for CIFAR-10,
whereas LLR shows only a decrease of 2%.
• We achieve new state of the art results for adversarial accuracy against untargeted white-box
attack for ImageNet (with  = 4/2552): 47%. Furthermore, we match state of the art results
for CIFAR 10 (with  = 8/255): 52.81%3.
• We perform a large scale evaluation of existing methods for adversarially robust training
under consistent, strong, white-box attacks. For this we recreate several baseline models
from the literature, training them both for CIFAR-10 and ImageNet (where possible).4
2 Background and Related Work
We denote our classification function by f(x; θ) : x 7→ RC , mapping input features x to the output
logits for classes in set C, i.e. pi(y|x; θ) = exp (fi(x; θ)) /
∑
j exp (fj(x; θ)), with θ being the
model parameters and y being the label. Adversarial robustness for f is defined as follows: a network
is robust to adversarial perturbations of magnitude  at input x if and only if
argmax
i∈C
fi(x; θ) = argmax
i∈C
fi(x+ δ; θ) ∀δ ∈ Bp() = {δ : ‖δ‖p ≤ }. (1)
1While computing the globally optimal adversarial example is NP-hard [11], gradient descent with several
random restarts was empirically shown to be quite effective at computing adversarial perturbations of sufficient
quality.
2This means that every pixel is perturbed independently by up to 4 units up or down on a scale where pixels
take values ranging between 0 and 255.
3We note that TRADES [28] gets 55% against a much weaker attack; under our strongest attack, it gets
52.5%.
4Baselines created are adversarial training, TRADES and CURE [19]. To the contrary of CIFAR-10, we are
currently unable to achieve consistent and competitive results on ImageNet at  = 4/255 using TRADES.
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In this paper, we focus on p =∞ and we use B() to denote B∞() for brevity. Given the dataset is
drawn from distribution D, the standard method to train a classifier f is empirical risk minimization
(ERM), which is defined by: minθ E(x,y)∼D[` (x; y, θ)]. Here, `(x; y, θ) is the standard cross-entropy
loss function defined by
`(x; y, θ) = −yT log (p(x; θ)) , (2)
where pi(x; θ) is defined as above, and y is a 1-hot vector representing the class label. While ERM is
effective at training neural networks that perform well on holdout test data, the accuracy on the test
set goes to zero under adversarial evaluation. This is a result of a distribution shift in the data induced
by the attack. To rectify this, adversarial training [19, 14] seeks to perturb the data distribution by
performing adversarial attacks during training. More concretely, adversarial training minimizes the
loss function
E(x,y)∼D
[
max
δ∈B()
`(x+ δ; y, θ)
]
, (3)
where the inner maximization, maxδ∈B() `(x+ δ; y, θ), is typically performed via a fixed number
of steps of a gradient-based optimization method. One such method is Projected-Gradient-Descent
(PGD) which performs the following gradient step:
δ ← Proj (δ − η∇δ`(x+ δ; y, θ)) , (4)
where Proj(x) = argminξ∈B() ‖x− ξ‖. Another popular gradient-based method is to use the
sign of the gradient [8]. The cost of solving Eq (3) is dominated by the cost of solving the inner
maximization problem. Thus, the inner maximization should be performed efficiently to reduce the
overall cost of training. A naive approach is to reduce the number of gradient steps performed by the
optimization procedure. Generally, the attack is weaker when we do fewer steps. If the attack is too
weak, the trained networks often display gradient obfuscation as highlighted in Fig 1.
Since the invention of adversarial training, a corpus of work has researched alternative ways of making
networks robust. One such approach is the TRADES method [28] which is a form of regularization
that specifically maximizes the trade-off between robustness and accuracy – as many studies have
observed these two quantities to be at odds with each other [24]. Others, such as work by Ding
et al [7] adaptively increase the perturbation radius by find the minimal length perturbation which
changes the output label. Some have proposed architectural changes which promote adversarial
robustness, such as the "denoise" model [26] for ImageNet.
The work presented in this paper is closely related to the paper by Moosavi et al [19], which highlights
that adversarial training reduces the curvature of `(x; y, θ) with respect to x. Leveraging an empirical
observation (the highest curvature is along the direction ∇x`(x; y, θ)), they further propose an
algorithm to mimic the effects of adversarial training on the loss surface. The algorithm results in
comparable performance to adversarial training with a significantly lower cost.
3 Motivating the Local Linearity Regularizer
As described above, the cost of adversarial training is dominated by solving the inner maximization
problem maxδ∈B() `(x+δ). Throughout we abbreviate `(x; y, θ) with `(x). We can reduce this cost
simply by reducing the number of PGD (as defined in Eq (4)) steps taken to solve maxδ∈B() `(x+δ).
To motivate the local linearity regularizer (LLR), we start with an empirical analysis of how the
behavior of adversarial training changes as we increase the number of PGD steps used during training.
We find that the loss surface becomes increasingly linear as we increase the number of PGD steps,
captured by the local linearity measure defined below.
3.1 Local Linearity Measure
Suppose that we are given an adversarial perturbation δ ∈ B(). The corresponding adversarial loss
is given by `(x+ δ). If our loss surface is smooth and approximately linear, then `(x+ δ) is well
approximated by its first-order Taylor expansion `(x) + δT∇x`(x). In other words, the absolute
difference between these two values,
g(δ;x) =
∣∣`(x+ δ)− `(x)− δT∇x`(x)∣∣ , (5)
3
is an indicator of how linear the surface is. Consequently, we consider the quantity
γ(, x) = max
δ∈B()
∣∣`(x+ δ)− `(x)− δT∇x`(x)∣∣ , (6)
to be a measure of how linear the surface is within a neighbourhood B(). We call this quantity the
local linearity measure.
3.2 Empirical Observations on Adversarial Training
20000 40000 60000
training steps
6
12
γ
(²
,x
)
1 steps
2 steps
(a)
20000 40000 60000
training steps
0.07
0.09
γ
(²
,x
)
4 steps
8 steps
16 steps
(b)
Figure 2: Plots showing that γ(, x) is large (on the order of 101) when we train with just one or two steps of
PGD for inner maximization, (2a). In contrast, γ(, x) becomes increasingly smaller (on the order of 10−1) as
we increase the number of PGD steps to 4 and above, (2b). The x-axis is the number of training iterations and
the y-axis is γ(, x), here  = 8/255 for CIFAR-10.
We measure γ(, x) for networks trained with adversarial training on CIFAR-10, where the inner
maximization maxδ∈B() `(x+ δ) is performed with 1, 2, 4, 8 and 16 steps of PGD. γ(, x) is mea-
sured throughout training on the training set5. The architecture used is a wide residual network [27]
28 in depth and 10 in width (Wide-ResNet-28-10). The results are shown in Fig 2a and 2b. Fig 2a
shows that when we train with one and two steps of PGD for the inner maximization, the local loss
surface is extremely non-linear. An example visualization of such a loss surface is given in Fig 5a.
However, when we train with four or more steps of PGD for the inner maximization, the surface
is relatively well approximated by `(x) + δT∇x`(x) as shown in Fig 2b. An example of the loss
surface is shown in Fig 5b. For the adversarial accuracy of the networks, see Table 4.
4 Local Linearity Regularizer (LLR)
From the section above, we make the empirical observation that the local linearity measure γ(, x)
decreases as we train with stronger attacks6. In this section, we give some theoretical justifications of
why local linearity γ(, x) correlates with adversarial robustness, and derive a regularizer from the
local linearity measure that can be used for training of robust models.
4.1 Local Linearity Upper Bounds Adversarial Loss
The following proposition establishes that the adversarial loss `(x+ δ) is upper bounded by the local
linearity measure, plus the change in loss as predicted by the gradient (which is given by |δT∇x`(x)|).
Proposition 4.1. Consider a loss function `(x) that is once-differentiable, and a local neighbourhood
defined by B(). Then for all δ ∈ B()
|`(x+ δ)− `(x)| ≤ |δT∇x`(x)|+ γ(, x). (7)
5To measure γ(, x) we find maxδ∈B() g(δ;x) with 50 steps of PGD using Adam as the optimizer and 0.1
as the step size.
6Here, we imply an increase in the number of PGD steps for the inner maximization maxδ∈B() `(x+ δ).
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See Appendix B for the proof.
From Eq (7) it is clear that the adversarial loss tends to `(x), i.e., `(x + δ) → `(x), as both
|δ>∇x`(x)| → 0 and γ(;x)→ 0 for all δ ∈ B(). And assuming `(x+ δ) ≥ `(δ) one also has the
upper bound `(x+ δ) ≤ `(x) + |δT∇x`(x)|+ γ(, x).
4.2 Local Linearity Regularization (LLR)
Following the analysis above, we propose the following objective for adversarially robust training
L(D) = ED
[
`(x) + µ|δTLLR∇x`(x)|+ λγ(, x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
LLR
]
, (8)
where λ and µ are hyper-parameters to be optimized, and δLLR = argmaxδ∈B()g(δ;x) (recall the
definition of g(δ;x) from Eq (5)). Concretely, we are trying to find the point δLLR in B() where the
linear approximation `(x) + δT∇x`(x) is maximally violated. To train we penalize both its linear
violation
∣∣`(x+ δLLR)− `(x)− δTLLR∇x`(x)∣∣ and the gradient magnitude term ∣∣δTLLR∇x`(x)∣∣, as
required by the above proposition. We note that, analogous to adversarial training, LLR requires
an inner optimization to find δLLR – performed via gradient descent. However, as we will show in
the experiments, much fewer optimization steps are required for the overall scheme to be effective.
Pseudo-code for training with this regularizer is given in Appendix E.
4.3 Local Linearity γ(;x) is a sufficient regularizer by itself
Interestingly, under certain reasonable approximations and standard choices of loss functions, we
can bound |δ>∇x`(x)| in terms of γ(;x). See Appendix C for details. Consequently, the bound in
Eq (7) implies that minimizing γ(;x) (along with the nominal loss `(x)) is sufficient to minimize the
adversarial loss `(x+ δ). This prediction is confirmed by our experiments. However, our experiments
also show that including |δ>∇x`(x)| in the objective along with `(x) and γ(;x) works better in
practice on certain datasets, especially ImageNet. See Appendix F.3 for details.
5 Experiments and Results
We perform experiments using LLR on both CIFAR-10 [13] and ImageNet [5] datasets. We show
that LLR gets state of the art adversarial accuracy on CIFAR-10 (at  = 8/255) and ImageNet (at
 = 4/255) evaluated under a strong adversarial attack. Moreover, we show that as the attack strength
increases, the degradation in adversarial accuracy is more graceful for networks trained using LLR
than for those trained with standard adversarial training. Further, we demonstrate that training using
LLR is 5× faster for ImageNet. Finally, we show that, by linearizing the loss surface, models are less
prone to gradient obfuscation.
CIFAR-10: The perturbation radius we examine is  = 8/255 and the model architectures we use
are Wide-ResNet-28-8, Wide-ResNet-40-8 [27]. Since the validity of our regularizer requires `(x) to
be smooth, the activation function we use is softplus function log(1 + exp(x)), which is a smooth
version of ReLU. The baselines we compare our results against are adversarial training (ADV) [16],
TRADES [28] and CURE [19]. We recreate these baselines from the literature using the same network
architecture and activation function. The evaluation is done on the full test set of 10K images.
ImageNet: The perturbation radii considered are  = 4/255 and  = 16/255. The architecture used
for this is from [10] which is ResNet-152. We use softplus as activation function. For  = 4/255,
the baselines we compare our results against is our recreated versions of ADV [16] and denoising
model (DENOISE) [26].7 For  = 16/255, we compare LLR to ADV [16] and DENOISE [26]
networks which have been published from the the literature. Due to computational constraints, we
limit ourselves to evaluating all models on the first 1K images of the test set.
To make sure that we have a close estimate of the true robustness, we evaluate all the models on a
wide range of attacks these are described below.
7We attempted to use TRADES on ImageNet but did not manage to get competitive results. Thus they are
omitted from the baselines.
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5.1 Evaluation Setup
To accurately gauge the true robustness of our network, we tailor our attack to give the lowest possible
adversarial accuracy. The two parts which we tune to get the optimal attack is the loss function for
the attack and its corresponding optimization procedure. The loss functions used are described below,
for the optimization procedure please refer to Appendix F.1.
Loss Functions: The three loss functions we consider are summarized in Table 1. We use the
difference between logits for the loss function rather than the cross-entropy loss as we have empirically
found the former to yield lower adversarial accuracy.
Attack Name Loss Function Metric
Random-Targeted maxδ∈B() fr(x+ δ)− ft(x+ δ) Attack Success Rate
Untargeted maxδ∈B() fs(x+ δ)− ft(x+ δ) Adversarial Accuracy
Multi-Targeted maxδ∈B() maxi∈C fi(x+ δ)− ft(x+ δ) Adversarial Accuracy
Table 1: This shows the loss functions corresponding to the attacks we use for evaluation and also the metric
we measure on the test set for each of these attacks. Notation-wise, s = argmaxi6=t fi(x + δ) is the highest
logit excluding the logits corresponding to the correct class t, note s can change through the optimization
procedure. For the Random-Targeted attack, r is a randomly chosen target label that is not t and does not change
throughout the optimization. C stands for the set of class labels. For the Multi-Targeted attack we maximize
fi(x+ δ)− fT (x+ δ) for all i ∈ C, and consider the attack successful if any of the individual attacks on each
each target class i are successful. The metric used on the Random-Targeted attack is the attack success rate:
the percentage of attacks where the target label r is indeed the output label (this metric is especially important
for ImageNet at  = 16/255). For the other attacks we use the adversarial accuracy as the metric which is the
accuracy on the test set after the attack.
5.2 Results for Robustness
CIFAR-10: Wide-ResNet-28-8 (8/255)
Methods Nominal FGSM-20 Untargeted Multi-Targeted
Attack Strength Weak Strong Very Strong
ADV[16] 87.25% 48.89% 45.92% 44.54%
CURE[19] 80.76% 39.76% 38.87% 37.57%
ADV(S) 85.11% 56.76% 53.96% 48.79%
CURE(S) 84.31% 48.56% 47.28% 45.43%
TRADES(S) 87.40% 51.63 50.46% 49.48%
LLR (S) 86.83% 54.24% 52.99% 51.13%
CIFAR-10: Wide-ResNet-40-8 (8/255)
ADV(R) 85.58% 56.32% 52.34% 46.89%
TRADES(R) 86.25% 53.38% 51.76% 50.84%
ADV(S) 85.27% 57.94% 55.26% 49.79%
CURE(S) 84.45% 49.41% 47.69% 45.51%
TRADES(S) 88.11% 53.03% 51.65% 50.53%
LLR (S) 86.28% 56.44% 54.95% 52.81%
Table 2: Model accuracy results for CIFAR-10. Our LLR regularizer performs the best under the strongest
attack (highlighted column). (S) denotes softplus activation; (R) denotes ReLU activation; and models with (S,
R) are our implementations.
For CIFAR-10, the main adversarial accuracy results are given in Table 2. We compare LLR training
to ADV [16], CURE [19] and TRADES [28], both with our re-implementation and the published
models 8. Note that our re-implementation using softplus activations perform at or above the published
results for ADV, CURE and TRADES. This is largely due to the learning rate schedule used, which is
the similar to the one used by TRADES [28].
Interestingly, for adversarial training (ADV), using the Multi-Targeted attack for evaluation gives
significantly lower adversarial accuracy compared to Untargeted. The accuracy obtained are 49.79%
8Note the network published for TRADES [28] uses a Wide-ResNet-34-10 so this is not shown in the table
but under the same rigorous evaluation we show that TRADES get 84.91% nominal accuracy, 53.41% under
Untargeted and 52.58% under Multi-Targeted.
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and 55.26% respectively. Evaluation using Multi-Targeted attack consistently gave the lowest
adversarial accuracy throughout. Under this attack, the methods which stand out amongst the rest are
LLR and TRADES. Using LLR we get state of the art results with 52.81% adversarial accuracy.
ImageNet: ResNet-152 (4/255)
Methods PGD steps Nominal Untargeted Random-Targeted
Accuracy Success Rate
ADV 30 69.20% 39.70% 0.50%
DENOISE 30 69.70% 38.90% 0.40%
LLR 2 72.70% 47.00% 0.40%
ImageNet: ResNet-152 (16/255)
ADV [26] 30 64.10% 6.30% 40.00%
DENOISE [26] 30 66.80% 7.50% 38.00%
LLR 10 51.20% 6.10% 43.80%
Table 3: LLR gets 47% adversarial accuracy for 4/255 – 7.30% higher than DENOISE and ADV. For 16/255,
LLR gets similar robustness results, but it comes at a significant cost to the nominal accuracy. Note Multi-
Targeted attacks for ImageNet requires looping over 1000 labels, this evaluation can take up to several days even
on 50 GPUs thus is omitted from this table. The column of the strongest attack is highlighted.
For ImageNet, we compare against adversarial training (ADV) [16] and the denoising model (DE-
NOISE) [26]. The results are shown in Table 3. For a perturbation radius of 4/255, LLR gets 47%
adversarial accuracy under the Untargeted attack which is notably higher than the adversarial accuracy
obtained via adversarial training which is 39.70%. Moreover, LLR is trained with just two-steps
of PGD rather than 30 steps for adversarial training. The amount of computation needed for each
method is further discussed in Sec 5.2.1.
Further shown in Table 3 are the results for  = 16/255. We note a significant drop in nominal
accuracy when we train with LLR to perturbation radius 16/255. When testing for perturbation radius
of 16/255 we also show that the adversarial accuracy under Untargeted is very poor (below 8%) for
all methods. We speculate that this perturbation radius is too large for the robustness problem. Since
adversarial perturbations should be, by definition, imperceptible to the human eye, upon inspection
of the images generated using an adversarial attack (see Fig 8) - this assumption no longer holds
true. The images generated appear to consist of super-imposed object parts of other classes onto the
target image. This leads us to believe that a more fine-grained analysis of what should constitute
"robustness for ImageNet" is an important topic for debate.
5.2.1 Runtime Speed
For ImageNet, we trained on 128 TPUv3 cores [9], the total training wall time for the LLR network
(4/255) is 7 hours for 110 epochs. Similarly, for the adversarially trained (ADV) networks the total
wall time is 36 hours for 110 epochs. This is a 5× speed up.
5.2.2 Accuracy Degradation: Strong vs Weak Evaluation
The resulting model trained using LLR degrades gracefully in terms of adversarial accuracy when we
increase the strength of attack, as shown in Fig 3. In particular, Fig 3a shows that, for CIFAR-10,
when the attack changes from Untargeted to Multi-Targeted, the LLR’s accuracy remains similar with
only a 2.18% drop in accuracy. Contrary to adversarial training (ADV), where we see a 5.64% drop
in accuracy. We also see similar trends in accuracy in Table 2. This could indicate that some level of
obfuscation may be happening under standard adversarial training.
As we empirically observe that LLR evaluates similarly under weak and strong attacks, we hypothesize
that this is because LLR explicitly linearizes the loss surface. An extreme case would be when the
surface is completely linear - in this instance the optimal adversarial perturbation would be found
with just one PGD step. Thus evaluation using a weak attack is often good enough to get an accurate
gauge of how it will perform under a stronger attack.
For ImageNet, see Fig 3b, the adversarial accuracy trained using LLR remains significantly higher
(7.5%) than the adversarially trained network going from a weak to a stronger attack.
7
Stronger Attack→48
50
52
54
56
58
60
62
A
d
v
er
sa
ri
al
A
cc
u
ra
cy
Multi TargetedUntargeted
1000× 20
1000× 20
1× 1
1× 1
10× 1
10× 1
20× 1
20× 1
50× 1
50× 1
100× 1
100× 1
200× 1
200× 1
1000× 1
1000× 1
200× 20
200× 20
LLR
ADV
(a) CIFAR-10 (8/255)
Stronger Attack→38
40
42
44
46
48
50
A
d
v
er
sa
ri
al
A
cc
u
ra
cy
1000× 1
1000× 1
1× 1
1× 1
10× 1
10× 1
20× 1
20× 1
50× 1
50× 1
100× 1
100× 1
200× 1
200× 1
LLR
ADV
(b) ImageNet (4/255)
Figure 3: Adversarial accuracy shown for CIFAR-10, (3a), and ImageNet, (3b), as we increase the strength
of attack. (3a) shows LLR’s adversarial accuracy degrades gracefully going from 53.32% to 51.14% (-2.18%)
while ADV’s adversarial accuracy drops from 54.43% to 48.79% (-5.64%). (3b) LLR remains 7.5% higher in
terms of adversarial accuracy (47.20%) compared to ADV (39.70%). The annotations on each node denotes no.
of PGD steps × no. of random restarts (see Appendix F.1). (3a), background color denotes whether the attack is
Untargeted (blue) or Multi-Targeted (orange). (3b), we only use Untargeted attacks.
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Figure 4: Comparing the loss surface, `(x), after we train using just 1 or 2 steps of PGD for the inner
maximization of either the adversarial objective (ADV) maxδ∈B() `(x+ δ) or the linearity objective (LLR)
γ(, x) = maxδ∈B()
∣∣`(x+ δ)− `(x)− δT∇`(x)∣∣. Results are shown for image 126 in test set of CIFAR-10,
the nominal label is deer. ADV-i refers to adversarial training with i PGD steps, similarly with LLR-i.
5.3 Resistance to Gradient Obfuscation
We use either the standard adversarial training objective (ADV-1, ADV-2) or the LLR objective
(LLR-1, LLR-2) and taking one or two steps of PGD to maximize each objective. To train LLR-1/2,
we only optimize the local linearity γ(, x), i.e. µ in Eq. (8) is set to zero. We see that for adversarial
training, as shown in Figs 4a, 4c, the loss surface becomes highly non-linear and jagged – in other
words obfuscated. Additionally in this setting, the adversarial accuracy under our strongest attack is
0% for both, see Table 6. In contrast, the loss surface is smooth when we train using LLR as shown in
Figs 4b, 4d. Further, Table 6 shows that we obtain an adversarial accuracy of 44.50% with the LLR-2
network under our strongest evaluation. We also evaluate the values of γ(, x) for the CIFAR-10 test
set after these networks are trained. This is shown in Fig 7. The values of γ(, x) are comparable
when we train with LLR using two steps of PGD to adversarial training with 20 steps of PGD. By
comparison, adversarial training with two steps of PGD results in much larger values of γ(, x).
6 Conclusions
We show that, by promoting linearity, deep classification networks are less susceptible to gradient
obfuscation, thus allowing us to do fewer gradient descent steps for the inner optimization. Our
novel linearity regularizer promotes locally linear behavior as justified from a theoretical perspective.
The resulting models achieve state of the art adversarial robustness on the CIFAR-10 and Imagenet
datasets, and can be trained 5× faster than regular adversarial training.
8
References
[1] Anish Athalye, Nicholas Carlini, and David Wagner. Obfuscated gradients give a false sense of
security: Circumventing defenses to adversarial examples. arXiv preprint arXiv:1802.00420,
2018.
[2] Jacob Buckman, Aurko Roy, Colin Raffel, and Ian Goodfellow. Thermometer encoding: One
hot way to resist adversarial examples. arXiv, 2018.
[3] Nicholas Carlini and David Wagner. Adversarial examples are not easily detected: Bypassing
ten detection methods. In Proceedings of the 10th ACM Workshop on Artificial Intelligence and
Security, pages 3–14. ACM, 2017.
[4] Nicholas Carlini and David Wagner. Towards evaluating the robustness of neural networks. In
2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), pages 39–57. IEEE, 2017.
[5] Jia Deng, Wei Dong, Richard Socher, Li-Jia Li, Kai Li, and Li Fei-Fei. Imagenet: A large-
scale hierarchical image database. In 2009 IEEE conference on computer vision and pattern
recognition, pages 248–255. Ieee, 2009.
[6] Guneet S Dhillon, Kamyar Azizzadenesheli, Zachary C Lipton, Jeremy Bernstein, Jean Kossaifi,
Aran Khanna, and Anima Anandkumar. Stochastic activation pruning for robust adversarial
defense. arXiv preprint arXiv:1803.01442, 2018.
[7] Gavin Weiguang Ding, Yash Sharma, Kry Yik Chau Lui, and Ruitong Huang. Max-margin
adversarial (mma) training: Direct input space margin maximization through adversarial training.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1812.02637, 2018.
[8] Ian J Goodfellow, Jonathon Shlens, and Christian Szegedy. Explaining and harnessing adversar-
ial examples. arXiv preprint arXiv:1412.6572, 2014.
[9] Google. Google, 2018. In https://cloud.google.com/tpu/, 2019.
[10] Kaiming He, Xiangyu Zhang, Shaoqing Ren, and Jian Sun. Deep residual learning for image
recognition. In Proceedings of the IEEE conference on computer vision and pattern recognition,
pages 770–778, 2016.
[11] Guy Katz, Clark Barrett, David L Dill, Kyle Julian, and Mykel J Kochenderfer. Reluplex:
An efficient smt solver for verifying deep neural networks. In International Conference on
Computer Aided Verification, pages 97–117. Springer, 2017.
[12] Diederik P Kingma and Jimmy Ba. Adam: A method for stochastic optimization. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1412.6980, 2014.
[13] Alex Krizhevsky and Geoffrey Hinton. Learning multiple layers of features from tiny images.
In Citeseer, 2009.
[14] Alexey Kurakin, Ian Goodfellow, and Samy Bengio. Adversarial machine learning at scale.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1611.01236, 2016.
[15] Xingjun Ma, Bo Li, Yisen Wang, Sarah M Erfani, Sudanthi Wijewickrema, Grant Schoenebeck,
Dawn Song, Michael E Houle, and James Bailey. Characterizing adversarial subspaces using
local intrinsic dimensionality. arXiv preprint arXiv:1801.02613, 2018.
[16] Aleksander Madry, Aleksandar Makelov, Ludwig Schmidt, Dimitris Tsipras, and Adrian Vladu.
Towards deep learning models resistant to adversarial attacks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1706.06083,
2017.
[17] James Martens. Deep learning via hessian-free optimization. In ICML, volume 27, pages
735–742, 2010.
[18] James Martens. New insights and perspectives on the natural gradient method. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1412.1193, 2014.
9
[19] Seyed-Mohsen Moosavi-Dezfooli, Alhussein Fawzi, Jonathan Uesato, and Pascal Frossard.
Robustness via curvature regularization, and vice versa. arXiv preprint arXiv:1811.09716, 2018.
[20] Nicolas Papernot, Patrick McDaniel, Xi Wu, Somesh Jha, and Ananthram Swami. Distillation as
a defense to adversarial perturbations against deep neural networks. In 2016 IEEE Symposium
on Security and Privacy (SP), pages 582–597. IEEE, 2016.
[21] Nicol N Schraudolph. Fast curvature matrix-vector products for second-order gradient descent.
Neural computation, 14(7):1723–1738, 2002.
[22] Yang Song, Taesup Kim, Sebastian Nowozin, Stefano Ermon, and Nate Kushman. Pixeldefend:
Leveraging generative models to understand and defend against adversarial examples. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1710.10766, 2017.
[23] Christian Szegedy, Wojciech Zaremba, Ilya Sutskever, Joan Bruna, Dumitru Erhan, Ian Goodfel-
low, and Rob Fergus. Intriguing properties of neural networks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1312.6199,
2013.
[24] Dimitris Tsipras, Shibani Santurkar, Logan Engstrom, Alexander Turner, and Aleksander Madry.
Robustness may be at odds with accuracy. stat, 1050:11, 2018.
[25] Jonathan Uesato, Brendan O’Donoghue, Aaron van den Oord, and Pushmeet Kohli. Adversarial
risk and the dangers of evaluating against weak attacks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1802.05666, 2018.
[26] Cihang Xie, Yuxin Wu, Laurens van der Maaten, Alan Yuille, and Kaiming He. Feature
denoising for improving adversarial robustness. arXiv preprint arXiv:1812.03411, 2018.
[27] Sergey Zagoruyko and Nikos Komodakis. Wide residual networks. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1605.07146, 2016.
[28] Hongyang Zhang, Yaodong Yu, Jiantao Jiao, Eric P Xing, Laurent El Ghaoui, and Michael I
Jordan. Theoretically principled trade-off between robustness and accuracy. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1901.08573, 2019.
10
A Empirical Observations on Adversarial Training: Supplementary
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Figure 5: A plot of `(x) around the image 126 of CIFAR-10 test set which shows that training with
just 1 step of PGD for adversarial training gets highly non-linear loss surface - (5a), while training
with 8 steps of PGD the surface becomes more smooth - (5b). (5a, 5b) are `(x) projection onto 2D
plane, where one direction is the adversarial perturbation while the other is random.
CIFAR-10: Wide-ResNet-28-10 (8/255)
No. of PGD step Nominal Accuracy Adversarial Accuracy
(Multi-Targeted)
1 84.42% 0.0%
2 83.67% 0.0%
4 87.70% 45.91%
8 87.20% 46.03%
16 86.78% 46.14%
Table 4: Table showing the corresponding nominal accuracy and adversarial accuracy for networks
trained shown in Fig 2. The Multi-Targeted is described in Sec. 5.1.
B Local Linearity Upper Bounds Robustness: Proof of Proposition 4.1
Proposition 4.1. Consider a loss function `(x) that is once-differentiable, and a local neighbourhood
defined by B(). Then for all δ ∈ B()
|`(x+ δ)− `(x)| ≤ |δ∇x`(x)|+ γ(, x).
Proof. Firstly we note that |`(x+ δ)− `(x)| can be rewritten as the following:
|`(x+ δ)− `(x)| = ∣∣δT∇x`(x) + `(x+ δ)− `(x)− δT∇x`(x)∣∣ .
Thus we can form the following bound:
|`(x+ δ)− `(x)| ≤ ∣∣δT∇x`(x)∣∣+ g(δ;x),
where g(δ;x) =
∣∣`(x+ δ)− `(x)− δT∇x`(x)∣∣. We note that since γ(, x) = maxδ∈B() g(δ;x),
therefore for all δ ∈ B()
|`(x+ δ)− `(x)| ≤ ∣∣δT∇x`(x)∣∣+ γ(, x).
C Local Linearity γ(, x) is a sufficient regularizer by itself
C.1 A local quadratic model of the loss
The starting point for proving our bounds will be the following local quadratic approximation of the
loss:
`(x+ δ) = `(x) + δ>∇x`(x) + 1
2
δ>G(x)δ + ε(δ), (9)
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Here, G(x) is the Generalized Gauss-Newton matrix (GGN) [21, 18], and ε(δ) denotes the error of
the approximation.
The GGN is a Hessian-alternative which appears frequently in approximate 2nd-order optimization
algorithms for neural networks. It is defined for losses of the form `(x) = ν(y, f(x)), where ν(y, z)
is convex in z. (Valid examples for ν(y, z) include the standard softmax cross-entropy error and
squared error.) It’s given by
G(x) = J>HνJ,
where J is the Jacobian of f , and Hν is the Hessian of ν(y, z) with respect to z.
One interpretation of the GGN is that it’s the Hessian of a modified loss ˆ`(x) ≡ ν(y, fˆ(x)), where
fˆ is the local linear approximation of f (given by fˆ(x + δ) = Jδ + f(x)). For certain standard
loss functions (including the ones we consider) it also corresponds to the Fisher Information Matrix
associated with the network’s predictive distribution [18].
In the context of optimization, the local quadratic approximation induced by the GGN tends to work
better than the actual 2nd-order Taylor series [e.g. 17], perhaps because it gives a better approximation
to `(x+ δ) over non-trivial distances [18]. (It must necessarily be a worse approximation for very
small values of δ, since the 2nd-order Taylor series is clearly optimal in that respect.)
C.2 Bounds for common loss functions
Our basic strategy in proving the following results is to rearrange Eq (9) to establish the following
bound on the curvature in terms of g(δ;x) which is defined in Eq (5) in the main text:
1
2
δ>G(x)δ = `(x+ δ)− (`(x) + δ>∇x`(x))− ε(δ)
≤ |`(x+ δ)− (`(x) + δ>∇x`(x))|+ |ε(δ)|
= g(δ;x) + |ε(δ)|. (10)
We then show that for both the squared error and softmax cross-entropy loss functions, one can
bound |δ>∇x`(x)| in terms of the curvature g(δ;x) and by extension is bounded by the local linearity
measure: γ(;x) = maxδ∈B() g(δ;x). Note that such a bound won’t exist for general loss functions.
Proposition C.1. Suppose that ν(y, z) = 12‖y − z‖2 is the squared error and z = f(x; θ) is the
output of the neural network. Then for any perturbation vector δ ∈ B() we have
|δ>∇x`(x)| ≤ 2
√
2`(x)(γ(;x) + |ε(δ)|),
where ε(δ) is the error of the local quadratic approximation defined in Equation 9.
Proposition C.2. Suppose that ν(y, z) = log(y>p(z)) is the softmax cross-entropy error, where y is
a 1-hot target vector, and p(z) is the vector of probabilities computed via the softmax function. Then
for any perturbation vector δ ∈ B() we have
|δ>∇x`(x)| ≤
√
2
y>p(z)
(γ(;x) + |ε(δ)|),
where ε(δ) is the error of the local quadratic approximation defined in Equation 9.
Remark. We note p>y is just the probability of the target label under the model. And so 1/p>y won’t
be very big, provided that the model is properly classifying the data with some reasonable degree of
certainty. (Indeed, for highly certain predictions it will be close to 1.) Thus the upper bound given in
Proposition C.2 should shrink at a reasonable rate as the regularizer γ(;x) does, provided that error
term ε(δ) is negligable.
D Proofs
D.1 Proof of Proposition C.1
Proof. For convenience we will write `(x) = 12‖r(x)‖2, where we have defined r(x) = y − f(x).
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We observe that for the squared error loss,∇x`(x) = −J>r and G(x) = J>J (because Hν = I).
Thus by Equation 10 we have
‖Jδ‖2 = δ>J>Jδ = δ>G(x)δ ≤ 2(g(δ;x) + |ε(δ)|) ≤ 2(γ(;x) + |ε(δ)|).
Using these facts, and applying the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we get
|δ>∇x`(x)|2 = | − δ>J>r|2
= |(Jδ)>r|2
≤ ‖Jδ‖2‖r‖2
≤ 8(γ(;x) + |ε(δ)|)`(x).
Taking the square root of both sides yields the claim.
D.2 Proof of Proposition C.2
Proof. We begin by defining r(x) = y − p, and observing that for the softmax cross-entropy loss,
∇x`(x) = −J>r, and H(x) = J>Hν(z)J where
Hν(z) = diag(p)− pp>.
Because the entries of p are non-negative and sum to 1 we can factor this as
Hν = CC
>, where C = diag(q)− pq>,
and where q is defined as the entry-wise square root of the vector p. To see that this is correct, note
that
CC> = (diag(q)− pq>)(diag(q)− pq>)>
= diag(q)2 − diag(q)qp> − pq> diag(q) + pq>qp>
= diag(p)− pp> − pp> + pp>
= Hν ,
where we have used the properties of q and p, such as q>q = 1, diag(q)q = p, etc.
Using this factorization we can rewrite the curvature term as
δ>G(x)δ = δ>J>Hν(z)Jδ = ∆z>Hν(z)∆z = ∆z>CC>∆z = ‖C>∆z‖2,
where we have defined ∆z = Jδ (intuitively, this is “the change in z due to δ”). Thus by Equation
10 we have
‖C>∆z‖2 ≤ 2(g(δ;x) + |ε(δ)|) ≤ 2(γ(;x) + |ε(δ)|).
Let v = 1
q>yy, which is well defined because q is entry-wise positive (since p must be), and y is a
one-hot vector. Using said properties of y and q we have that
Cv = (diag(q)− pq>) 1
q>y
y
=
1
q>y
q  y − 1
q>y
p(q>y)
= y − p = r,
where  denotes the entry-wise product.
It thus follows that
δ>∇x`(x) = −δ>J>r = z>r = ∆z>(Cv) = (C>∆z)>v.
Using the above facts, and applying the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we arrive at
|δ>∇x`(x)|2 = |(C>∆z)>v|2 ≤ ‖C>∆z‖2‖v‖2
≤ 2(γ(;x) + |ε(δ)|) 1
(q>y)2
‖y‖2
=
2
p>y
(γ(;x) + |ε(δ)|),
where we have used the facts that (q>y)2 = p>y and ‖y‖ = 1. Taking the square root of both sides
yields the claim.
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E Local Linearity Regularizer - Algorithm
Algorithm 1 Local Linearization of Network
Require: Training data X = {(x1, y1), · · · , (xN , yN )}. Learning rate lr and batch size for training
b and number of iterations N . Number of iterations for inner optimization M and step size s and
network architecture parameterized by θ.
1: Initialize variables θ.
2: for all i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N} do
3: Get mini-batch B = {(xi1 , yi1), · · · , (xib , yib)}.
4: Calculte loss wrt to minibatch LB = 1b
∑b
j=1 `(xij ; yij ).
5: Initialize initial perturbation δ uniformly in the interval [−, ].
6: for all j ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,M} do
7: Calculate g = 1b
∑b
t=1∇δg(δ;xit , yit) at δ.
8: Update δ ← Proj(δ − s×Optimizer(g))
9: end for
10: Compute objective L = LB + 1/b
∑b
j=1
(
λg(δ;xij , yij ) + µ
∣∣δT∇xl(x)∣∣)
11: θ ← θ − lr ×Optimizer(∇θL)
12: end for
Note g(δ;x, y) = `(x+ δ; y)− `(x; y)− δT∇x`(x; y).
F Experiments and Results: Supplementary
F.1 Evaluation Setup
Optimization: Rather than using the sign of the gradient (FGSM) [8], we do the update steps
using Adam [12] as the optimizer. More concretely, the update on the adversarial perturbation
is δ ← Proj (δ − ηAdam(∇δl(x+ δ; y))). We have consistently found that using Adam gives a
stronger attack compared to the sign of the gradient. For Multi-Targeted (see Table 1), the step
size is set to be η = 0.1 and we run for 200 steps. For Untargeted and Random-Targeted, we use
a step size schedule setting η = 0.1 up until 100 steps then 0.01 up until 150 steps and 0.001 for
the last 50 steps. We find these to give us the best adversarial accuracy evaluation, the decrease in
step size is especially helpful in cases where the gradient is obfuscated. Furthermore, we use 20
different random initialization (we term this a random restart) of the perturbation, δ0, for going
through the optimization procedure. We consider an attack successful if any of these 20 random
restarts is successful. For CIFAR-10 we also show results for FGSM with 20 steps (FGSM-20) with a
step size /10 as this is a commonly used attack for evaluation.
F.2 Training and Hyperparameters
CIFAR-10: For all of the baselines we recreated and the LLR network we used the same schedule
which is inspired by TRADES [28]. For Wide-ResNet-28-8, we use initial learning rate 0.1 and we
decrease after 100 and 105 epochs. We train till 110 epochs. For Wide-ResNet-40-8 we use initial
learning rate 0.1 and we decrease after 100 and 105 epochs with a factor of 0.1. We train to 110
epochs. The optimizer we used momentum 0.9. For LLR the λ = 4 and µ = 3, the weight placed on
the nominal loss `(x) is also 2. We use l2-regularization of 2e-4. The training is done on a batch size
of 256. We also slowly increase the size of the perturbation radius over 15 epochs starting from 0.0
until it gets to 8/255. For Wide-ResNet-28-8, Wide-ResNet-40-8 we train with 10 and 15 steps of
PGD respectively using Adam with step size of 0.1.
ImageNet (4/255): To train the LLR network the initial learning rate is 0.1, the decay schedule
is similar to [26], we decay by 0.1 after 35, 70 and 95 epochs. We train for 100 epochs. The LLR
hyperparameters are λ = 3 and µ = 6, the weights placed on the nominal loss is 3. We use l2-
regularization of 1e-4. The training is done on batch size of 512. We slowly increase the perturbation
radius over 20 epochs from 0 to 4/255. We train with 2 steps of PGD using Adam and step size 0.1.
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ImageNet (16/255): To train the LLR network the initial learning rate is 0.1, we decay by 0.1 after
17 and 35 epochs and 50 epochs – we train to 55 epochs. The LLR hyperparameters are λ = 3 and
µ = 9, the weights placed on the nominal loss is 3. We use l2-regularization of 1e-4. The training
is done on batch size of 512. We slowly increase the perturbation radius over 90 epochs from 0 to
16/255. We train with 10 steps of PGD using Adam with step size of 0.1.
Batch Normalization During training we use the local batch statistics at the nominal point. Sup-
pose µ, σ denotes the local batch statistics at every layer of the network for point x. Let us also
denote `(x; y, µ, σ) to be the loss function corresponding to when we use batch statistics µ and σ.
Then the loss we calculate at train time is the following
`(x; y, µ, σ) + µ
∣∣δTLLR∇x`(x; y, µ, σ)∣∣+ λ max
δ∈B()
g(δ;x, y, µ, σ),
where δLLR = argmaxδ∈B()g(δ;x, y, µ, σ) and
g(δ;x, y, µ, σ) =
∣∣`(x+ δ; y, µ, σ)− `(x; y, µ, σ)− δT∇x`(x; y, µ, σ)∣∣ .
F.3 Ablation Studies
CIFAR-10: Wide-ResNet-28-8 (8/255)
Regularizer Nominal Untargeted Multi-Targeted
Accuracy
λγ(, x) 84.75% 50.42% 49.38%
µ|δTLLR∇x`(x)|+λγ(, x) 86.83% 52.99% 51.13%
ImageNet: ResNet-152 (4/255)
Regularizer Nominal Untargeted Random-Targeted
Accuracy Success Rate
λγ(, x) 71.40% 41.30% 1.90%
µ|δTLLR∇x`(x)|+λγ(, x) 72.70% 47.00% 0.40%
Table 5: By removing
∣∣δT∇xl(x)∣∣B from LLR shown in Eq. (8), the adversarial accuracy evaluated
using multi-targeted reduces by 1.75% for CIFAR-10 while the adversarial reduces by 5.70%.
We investigate the effects of adding the term
∣∣δT∇xl(x)∣∣ into LLR shown in Eq. (8). The results
are shown in Table 5. We can see that adding the term
∣∣δT∇x`(x)∣∣ only yields minor improvements
to the adversarial accuracy (49.38% vs 51.13%) for CIFAR-10, while we get a boost of almost 6%
adversarial accuracy for ImageNet (41.30% vs 47.00%).
F.4 Resistance to Gradient Obfuscation
CIFAR-10: Wide-ResNet-28-8 (8/255)
Methods PGD steps Nominal Untargeted Multi-Targeted
ADV-1 1 88.45% 0.00% 0.00%
ADV-2 2 76.63% 0.00% 0.00%
LLR-1 1 93.03% 1.80% 1.60%
LLR-2 2 90.46% 46.47% 44.50%
Table 6: This shows that LLR trained with even just two steps of PGD can get an adversarial accuracy
of 44.50% under the strongest evaluation, while both adversarially trained networks (ADV-1, ADV-2)
gets 0.0%.
In Fig 6 we show the adversarial perturbations for networks ADV-2 and LLR-2. We see that, in
contrast to LLR-2, the adversarial perturbation for ADV-2 looks similar to random noise. When the
adversarial perturbation resembles random noise, this is often a sign that the network is gradient
obfuscated.
Furthermore, we show that the adversarial accuracy for LLR-2 is 44.50% as opposed to ADV-2 which
is 0%. Surprisingly, even training with just 1 step of PGD for LLR (LLR-1) we obtain non-zero
adversarial accuracy.
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Label: deer - Prediction: deer - Adversarial: bird
(a) ADV-2
Label: deer - Prediction: deer - Adversarial: bird
(b) LLR-2
Figure 6: We show adversarial examples arising from training with either 2-step PGD adversarial
training or 2-step PGD LLR. For both (a) and (b), the first image is the original, the second is the
adversarially perturbed image and the third image to is the scaled adversarial perturbation found
using 50 steps of PGD.
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Figure 7: This is a histogram plot of the values of
√
γ(8/255, x) on the test set after training is done
either with two steps of PGD for the linearity objective (orange); two-steps of PGD for the adversarial
objective (blue) or 20 steps of PGD for the adversarial objective (green). The statistics of γ(, x)
after training with 2-steps of PGD with the linearity objective aligns well with training using 20 steps
of the adversarial objective. In contrast, training with 2-steps of PGD of the adversarial objective gets
very different looking histogram, where we obtain much higher values of γ(, x).
In Fig 7, we show the values of γ(, x) we obtain when we train with LLR or adversarial training
(ADV). To find γ(, x) = maxδ∈B() g(δ, x) we maximize g(δ, x) by running 50 steps of PGD with
step size 0.1. Here, we see that values of γ(, x) for adversarial training with 20 steps of PGD is
similar to LLR-2. In contrast, adversarial training (ADV-2) with just two steps of PGD gives much
higher values of γ(, x).
F.5 Adversarially Perturbed Images for 16/255
The perturbation radius 16/255 has become the norm [14, 26] to use to gauge how robust a network is
on ImageNet. However, to be robust we need to make sure that the perturbation is sufficiently small
such that it does not significantly affect our visual perception. We hypothesize that this perturbation
radius is outside of this regime. Fig 8 shows that we can find examples which not only wipe out
objects (the curbs) in the image, but can actually add faint images onto the white background. This
significantly affects our visual perception of the image.
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Label: bobsled - Prediction: tench - Adversarial: washbasin
Label: bobsled - Prediction: tench - Adversarial: washer
Label: bobsled - Prediction: tench - Adversarial: snowmobile
Figure 8: Images created with adversarial attack on a LLR model for perturbation radius 16/255.
The image which is attacked is the 1st of the validation set for ImageNet, the true label is "bobsled".
Each row displays the images in the following order: original image, adversarially perturbed image
and the adversarial perturbation (scaled). The attack attempts to imprint faint images onto the white
background. Additionally, the curb (where we often expect a bobsled to be next to) on the right of the
original image has been completely removed by the attack.
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